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1 Introduction 
The negative impacts of corruption and poor quality of institutions on economic development are 
well established. Institutional improvement is a slow process, and simply changing formal 
procedures will not necessarily have the desired effect. Institutional reform will often imply that 
more concerns and political motivations are taken into consideration, and the demand on 
administrative procedures increases. The introduction of more administrative procedures to ensure 
consumer welfare may result in greater bureaucratic complexity. Greater complexity, in turn, can 
provide new opportunities to hide corruption, however. Thus, rather than protecting consumer 
interests more procedures may result in higher levels of corruption and inferior sector performance.2 
 
Whether more complexity works to secure consumer welfare or is exploited as a tool for hiding 
corruption may depend upon the general quality of institutions and governance. Hence, the same set 
of procedures might result in different outcomes across countries depending on levels of income, 
credibility of legal systems, and human capacity.3 This is particularly relevant for the utilities 
sectors, which are often natural monopolies, characterized by economies of scale and low marginal 
costs. There are often few firms, and the incentives and opportunities to benefit from market power 
are higher than in other sectors. Thus there is a stronger need for regulation through bureaucracy. 
The variation across countries in how complexity works might therefore be expressed more strongly 
in utilities compared to many other industries. 
 
There is limited empirical information about how the establishment of comprehensive 
administrative procedures fulfils the goal of higher consumer welfare in terms of improved sector 
performance. Even if greater complexity increased welfare in higher-income countries with well 
functioning institutions and a credible legal system, it might raise the level of corruption where 
institutions are weaker. There are, however, a few studies that address the linkage between various 
forms of governance and infrastructural performance. Estache, Goicoechea and Trujillo (2006) find 
that regulatory reforms offset the effects of corruption on performance indicators only to a limited 
extent and that the effectiveness of reforms is reduced when there is a higher level of corruption. 
Gasmi, Noumba and Virto (2006) find the positive effect of political accountability on the 
performance of regulation to be stronger in developing countries. 
 
This study explores how performance across the utility sectors, such as electricity, water and 
telecoms, is affected by the connection between the level of corruption and the level of bureaucratic 
complexity. We apply data from the Doing Business and Enterprise Surveys Database collected by 
the World Bank. In Section 2 of the paper we first look at whether performance in the electricity, 
water and telecoms sectors in developing countries is systematically affected by the levels of 
corruption and complexity. We go on to test more thoroughly the relationship between bureaucratic 
complexity, corruption, and levels of income. 
We find that in general, service delivery in the utilities functions significantly better in countries 
with few procedures and low levels of corruption. We also find that the pattern with respect to 
corruption, complexity and sector performance differs across income levels. In general, complexity 
                                                     
2 Large parts of the literature on corruption relate to the various ways in which corruption can be caused by poor 
institutional quality (for an overview, see Aidt, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 1999, 2004; Bardhan; 1997). 
3 For instance, the number of procedures behind the award of licenses to operate a business is the same in Bangladesh and 
Norway, which experience very different challenges with respect to corruption. On the basis of information about the 
number of procedures in dealing with the public as part of doing business in a country, Germany and Thailand are ranked 
very equally, while Italy is ranked worse than Colombia, and Spain is ranked worse than Puerto Rico. And yet, the higher 
number of procedures and greater bureaucracy are part of a system with higher levels of welfare in Germany, Italy and 
Spain, compared to Thailand, Colombia and Puerto Rico (Doing Business Database). 
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(the number of procedures) is a significant determinant of corruption levels, but the effect depends 
on the income level. Higher confidence in the judiciary also tends to reduce corruption. For 
developing countries only, the effect of fewer procedures is smaller but still significant. Our 
findings support the notion that simple procedures, by lessening the problem of corruption, holds 
potential for improving performance. 
2 Corruption and Complexity in Utilities 
We know that regulatory decisions can be extremely important for firms in the utility sector and 
they will often have every incentive to influence their terms. A high level of technical complexity of 
provision and complex financial contracting provide many ways to hide corrupt transactions. 
Hence, despite the presence of advanced administrative procedures the risk of corruption is 
perceived to be high in these sectors (Transparency International, 2003; Finger and Allouche, 2002; 
Hall and Lobina, 2002; Søreide, 2006a). 
 
Advanced bureaucratic procedures are not a clear cut concept, however. First, there might be a 
number of formal procedures, yet informal solutions may prevail. Rules are not necessarily 
respected or they may be politically overruled. Second, bureaucratic procedures are usually 
established to improve welfare and smooth regulation, yet also these decisions can be influenced by 
corruption. “Greasing the wheels” -theories suggest that bribery speeds up bureaucratic procedures 
(Leff, 1964; and Huntington, 1968:386). Kaufmann and Wei (1999) tested this theory empirically, 
and found that higher levels of corruption implied more time spent dealing with the bureaucracy for 
the business community. Third, it is not obvious how to count procedures. The time it takes to 
comply with procedures might vary substantially. However, it is not unreasonable to assume that a 
higher number of procedures entail more bureaucratic complexity.  
 
Bureaucratic complexity can facilitate corruption in several ways, and the problem is relevant for all 
stages of the regulatory process: (i) prior to operation, in some form of tender manipulation; (ii) 
during operation, for instance through opportunistic renegotiation of operational terms; or (iii) when 
the term of operation comes to an end, most relevantly to ensure a new term without competition.4 
If many concerns are included in the decision-making processes, such as the protection of domestic 
industrial development, trade politics, employment issues, environmental concerns or district 
politics, these can be exploited to hide a biased decision. There is then often a legitimate argument 
that will fit with the characteristics of a company that offers bribes or make significant party 
contributions. Complex award procedures may provide more opportunities to argue for a certain 
aspect, and to hide corruption. General monitoring and auditing systems may thus be 
comprehensive, yet still not able to detect corruption.5 
 
A bureaucratic hierarchy, established to facilitate the functions of the state by delegating 
responsibilities, may contain structures that encourage principal-agent problems, instead of 
preventing collusion between agents and firms.6 An important distinction must be made between 
corruption initiated by public officials who make decisions that are against the will of the political 
levels, and corruption initiated by representatives of the political level, who influence bureaucratic 
procedures to fulfill a corrupt deal with a private firm.  
                                                     
4 See Guasch (2003) for empirical results on renegotiation in utilities, and discussion about opportunistic renegotiation. 
5 See Della Porta and Vannucci (1999), who argue for more quality control in procurement procedures, because there are 
so many ways of manipulating the system. 
6 The principal-agent relationship has therefore been much applied to the exploration of corruption, see for instance 
Mishra (2006), Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), Olsen and Torsvik (1998) and Laffont and Martimort (1997). This 
literature makes an important distinction between benevolent and non-benevolent principals (Aidt, 2003). 
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The first category, corruption conducted by public officials, will represent a violation of procedures, 
either by making it look like as if all rules have been respected (through bid rigging or violation of 
communication rules, for instance), or by misusing legitimate deviations from the rules (for instance 
by referring to discretionary decisions, extraordinary circumstances or previous experience). The 
opportunities for such corruption depend on the number and/or nature of procedures. Such 
complexity can either enforce integrity or increase corruption (Moody-Stuart, 1997).7 
 
The second category, political corruption, will in this setting refer to the many ways that political 
levels can influence bureaucratic procedures, for instance by giving instructions to regulatory bodies 
on how to prioritize between tender criteria or factors that appear to support a political goal. Even if 
the nature of corruption differs between these categories, depending on benevolent versus non-
benevolent principal, it may under each circumstance be easier to hide or carry out the crime if the 
administrative rules are many or intricate.8 
 
We have limited information about who initiates corruption, and we do not know the extent to 
which the problem tends to be caused by those who offer bribes or those who receive them. This 
will probably depend on relative bargaining powers and particular characteristics of institutions and 
markets.9 There is also limited information about the private sector's influence on its own regulatory 
terms and how and why this varies across countries and sectors, although there is strong reason to 
believe that the problem escalates when legal institutions and monitoring systems are weak 
(Laffont, 2003). A combination of weak constitutional control over the government, limited contract 
enforcement, and sunk investments on the side of the firms, not only creates opportunities to 
demand bribes through extortion, but may also increase firms' incentives to offer bribes, for instance 
in order to reduce the political risk. 
 
Studies of the linkage between governance and infrastructural performance include Estache et al. 
(2006) and Gasmi et al. (2006). Estache et al. (2006) consider specifically whether the benefits of 
regulatory reform depend on the extent of corruption. Their study addresses reforms in the energy, 
telecoms and water and sanitation sectors separately. Performance is described in terms of the 
quality, access and prices of the services. They find that reforms offset the effects of corruption on 
the performance indicators only to a limited extent. The effectiveness of reforms is also reduced 
when there is a higher level of corruption. Gasmi et al. (2006) analyze the relationship between 
political accountability and regulatory performance in the telecom sector in developed and 
developing countries. They measure the quality of political institutions by estimates of local and 
global accountability.10 
 
Regulatory performance is represented by mainline penetration rates and mainlines per employee. 
Gasmi et al. (2006) find the positive effect of political accountability on the performance of 
regulation to be stronger in developing countries. They also find that global accountability variables 
                                                     
7 The balance between discretionary decisions and simple rules is difficult, however, since reduced discretion often will 
require more detailed rules (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999) 
8 Similarly, the mechanisms to control corruption such as control mechanisms, transparency and sanctions, will function 
differently in these different circumstances. Independent regulatory bodies will seldom be a solution, however. The 
underlying challenge is related to questions of political benevolence, a long-term horizon for political decisons, and the 
function of democracy. When these factors work there is little reason to make the regulatory bodies independent, and 
when they do not there is little reason to expect independence to work. 
9 On bargaining powers and bribery, see Svensson (2003) and Clarke and Xu (2004), for instance. 
10 Local accountability is measured by estimates of the political and financial independence of the regulator, the level of 
transparency of accounts and regulatory decisions, the clarity of the allocation of tasks among institutions, and the nature 
of the legal environment. Global accountability is captured in variables that reflect the quality of the institutional 
framework, such as corruption, bureaucratic quality, law and order, risk of expropriation and currency risk - IRIS dataset, 
Knack and Keefer (1987-1997) and International Country Risk Guide ratings 1990-1999, and the quality of the political 
process and its checks and balances (Database of Political Institutions 1975-2000, Keefer, The World Bank, 2002). 
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seem to be in a stronger causal relationship with regulatory performance than local accountability 
variables, especially in developing countries. 
 
We find that there is indeed a positive correlation between the level of corruption and complexity 
such that countries with lower levels of corruption will also be characterized by less complexity, 
and vice versa, that countries with higher levels of corruption will more often have higher levels of 
complexity. We show that on average, sector performance is better when corruption levels are 
lower. 
2.1 Measuring performance, complexity and corruption 
Two of the major challenges when exploring the relationship between corruption and complexity 
empirically are (i) to identify proper measures of complexity and (ii) to determine what are the 
proper control variables. In addition, there is limited data availability on the performance of the 
utilities. The most relevant measures of complexity are available for only four years (2003-2006). 
There is little variation over time for each country, and the number of some procedures remains the 
same for the majority of the countries over the period. Also, the data on complexity and corruption 
are more recent than the data on necessary control variables, which are available up to 2004. Given 
the relatively small change in the measures we are considering, we perform cross-country 
regressions on the average value of variables for the 2001-2006 period, and not panel regressions. 
Corruption 
There are several perception-based indices that seek to capture the level of corruption in large 
samples of countries, such as the Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International, the 
corruption measure from the ICRG index of political stability, and the corruption part of the World 
Bank's Governance Indicators. While these have all been applied for empirical analysis, this study 
uses the World Bank's indicator of corruption. The World Bank indicator appears to be the most 
general measure of corruption in a country. This estimate is part of a larger set of data, where the 
other measures included are voice, political stability, government effectiveness, law and regulatory 
quality. There are 84 developing countries included in the sample, and the data are available for the 
period 1996-2005, annually since 2002. The scores in the World Bank control of corruption index 
varies from -1.225 to 1.924 where a higher value indicates better control of corruption, which 
implies a lower level of corruption. The number of procedures for starting a business varies between 
4 and 17. Ireland has the lowest number of procedures while Uganda, Brazil and Paraguay have the 
highest numbers. There is a large variation in the confidence variable ranging from 17 to 90 percent, 
with the lowest estimate for Bangladesh and the highest for Germany. Although the World Bank 
indicator has been criticized we still believe it to be the most suitable measure for our purpose.11 
Complexity 
There is no distinct cross-country estimate of complexity in bureaucratic procedures. Although there 
are some measures of regulatory quality and some bureaucratic functions, such as bureaucratic 
quality by ICRG, they do not measure complexity as such. The Doing Business Database, provided 
by the World Bank, provides information on the number of procedures and time needed for starting 
a business, dealing with licenses, registering property, enforcing contracts, and more. If the number 
of such procedures does suggest more complexity, the time spent complying with procedures should 
be positively correlated with the number of procedures. 
 
 
                                                     
11 For a discussion on the suitability of these indicators see Knack (2006). 
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Table 1. Correlation between number of procedures and time spend complying 
Starting a Business Dealing with Licenses Registering Property Enforcing Contracts 
0.421 0.235 0.053 0.312 
 
Table 1 indicates that there is a positive correlation between the time spent and number of some of 
the procedures, and that this correlation is stronger when it comes to the number of procedures to 
start a business. This variable is an average of all generic procedures that are officially required for 
an entrepreneur to start up an industrial or commercial business in a country. The estimations are 
based on a set of assumptions about the firm, and the procedures are official, not part of an informal 
system, and apply to all businesses.12 
 
The other alternatives from the Doing Business dataset are related to specific tasks, such as dealing 
with licenses when constructing a warehouse. One of the advantages of applying one of the Doing 
Business Indicators is that the agencies involved are assumed to function without corruption. Based 
on these considerations we prefer the number of procedures necessary to start a business variable 
from the Doing Business Database as our measure of complexity throughout the paper. Thus, our 
findings depend on the suitability of this variable as and indicator of overall bureaucratic 
complexity. Generally, as shown by the governance indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2006) the 
bureaucratic functions are correlated. We make the implicit assumption that when procedures are 
complex in one sphere of the economy this is a general trait. 
Performance 
Performance of service delivery in the infrastructural sectors is most often measured by quality, 
rates and access. For our study we include measures of performance from the energy, water and 
sanitation and telecom sectors. The different performance measures are associated with either 
quality of service, accessibility or price. We have included measures of quality and accessibility for 
all three sectors, but the price of service delivery is available for a sufficient number of countries in 
the telecom sector only. The measures included are listed in Table 3 page 8. 
2.2 The Impact of Corruption and Complexity on Utility Performance 
We have a highly restricted dataset as measures of sector-specific performance are relatively scarce. 
Thus we base this part of the analysis on descriptive statistics. We consider only the developing 
countries. The countries are divided across two dimensions, corruption and complexity. Half of the 
countries are defined as being more corrupt and the other half as being less corrupt. The same 
division is made according to the level of complexity with respect to bureaucratic complexity. 
Countries are thus placed in one of four categories depending on the level of corruption and 
complexity. The categories are denoted as I) Less Corruption & Less Complexity, II) Less 
Corruption and More Complexity, III) More Corruption and Less Complexity, and IV) More 
Corruption and More Complexity. The number of countries in each category is listed in Table 2. 
 
As described by Table 2, 53 of the 84 countries fall into categories I and IV where we have little 
corruption and less complexity and more corruption and greater complexity, respectively. Thus 
there is a noticeable pattern whereby well over 60% of the countries display similar levels of 
complexity and corruption. We find that 5 out of 11 oil-rich countries fall into the group 
characterized by more corruption and more procedures.13 
                                                     
12 See World Bank, 2006 for more information. 
13 These are Algeria, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Ecuador and Syria. Russia and Kazakhstan fall into category III, Cape Verde, 
Colombia and Egypt are in category II with less corruption and more procedures, whereas Oman is in category I where we 
have less corruption and less complexity. 
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Table 2. Country Group Categories 
Category Developing Countries (84) 
I Less Corruption & Less Complexity 26 
II Less Corruption & More Complexity 16 
III More Corruption & Less Complexity 15 
IV More Corruption & More Complexity 27 
 
 
First we consider the effect of complexity and corruption on utility performance separately. We find 
that less complexity is associated with better performance. On average, countries that are less 
corrupt will also perform better than those deemed to have a higher level of corruption. In Table 3 
we list the mean and standard deviation of a range of performance indicators for the “level 
categories” IV and I.  
 
Table 3 suggests that there are in fact such systematic differences whereby the “few procedures-
more control of corruption” countries perform better in most infrastructure performance measures 
than do the “more procedures - less control of corruption” -group.  
 
Table 3. Comparing Performance Between Countries in Categories I and IV 
Less Corruption &  
Less Complexity 
(I) 
More Corruption & More 
Complexity 
(IV) Measure of sector performance     
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Delay in Obtaining an Electrical Connection*  26 15.78 14.33 27 25.10 21.28
Number of Electrical Outages* 25 17.77 37.29 26 25.00 28.87
Electric Power Consumption, 1000 kWh pr Cap 22 2.45 1.68 22 1.08 0.91
Delay in Obtaining a Mainline Tel. Connection* 26 16.59 27.12 27 37.57 45.12
Telephone Subscribers per Employee 17 344.15 169.59 16 247.85 206.31
Telephone Faults per 100 Mainlines 22 24.28 18.24 14 53.12 47.49
International Voice Traffic, Minutes per Person 24 57.27 34.66 23 38.92 53.60
Internet Users per 1000 People 26 124.57 95.21 27 30.86 28.10
Population Covered by Mobile Telephony 23 86.16 16.41 25 68.78 21.53
International Internet Bandwidth, Bits per Person 25 286.44 543.75 27 18.99 38.87  
Price Basket for Internet 26 26.41 12.82 27 40.37 32.25
Price Basket for Mobile 25 12.07 4.95 26 11.35 9.08
Price Basket for Fixed Line 26 11.91 4.79 25 6.88 3.81
Number of water Supply Failures* 26 7.53 11.49 26 20.31 35.51
Improved Sanitation, % of Pop. with Access 21 74.19 21.46 24 59.35 21.32
Improved Water Source, % of Pop. with Access 21 84.52 12.18 25 78.82 15.23
* days       
 
 
The observed pattern does suggest that fewer procedures and less corruption are associated with 
better performance in utilities among developing countries. The only deviation from this general 
pattern is found in the prices of telecoms services.  In the case of prices for mobile telephony, 
Pakistan, China, the Philippines, Guatemala and Indonesia contribute to the low average price in the 
group. In the case of fixed line telephony prices are lower in the former Soviet Republics and in 
Syria and China. 
 
Figure 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of selected performance indicators from the 
energy, water and telecoms sectors for the four categories. The countries in category I, with less 
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corruption and less complexity, are the best performers when measured by group average for five of 
the six performance indicators in the figure. We see that the countries in categories I and III, which 
are both associated with less complexity, experience fewer delays when obtaining both an electrical 
connection and a mainline telephone connection. When we consider the number of telephone 
subscribers per employee and the share of the population covered by mobile telephony, it is 
countries in categories I and II, with less corruption and complexity, that perform better. However, 
the price of telephony is lower for categories III and IV where there is more corruption and less and 
more complexity, respectively. Thus prices are higher where coverage is best and vice versa. It 
might be therefore that the extra cost of better coverage is manifested in higher prices. 
 
When we look at performance for the countries that are characterized by more complexity we see 
that overall, the group of countries with less corruption performs better (countries in the II category 
outperform those in the IV category from Figure 1). The only deviation from this general pattern for 
these six indicators is the delay in obtaining an electrical connection where the more corrupt 
countries on average have fewer delays. 
 
 
Figure 1. Summary Statistics for Selected Performance Indicators by Categories (I-IV) 
 
 
 
We are also interested in assessing the effect of income levels, and thereby institutional quality, on 
how complexity and corruption affects performance in the infrastructure sector. 14 The sample of 84 
developing countries is therefore divided into two sub-groups of 42 countries, each based on 
average per capita income over the last decade. We refer to these as the higher and lower income 
groups, although they are all developing countries. Table 4 shows the number of developing 
countries that fall into each of the eight categories based on the number of procedures, level of 
                                                     
14 Income levels correlate with institutional quality, and may thus be an indicator of the impact of institutional quality.  
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corruption and income level. First we notice that 29 of the 42 countries in the higher-income half of 
the sample fall into the less corruption categories, whereas the same share of countries in the lower-
income half falls into more corruption categories. Thus there is a correlation also between 
corruption and income levels. This is not the case for income and complexity, though, where the 
division is relatively similar across both dimensions: 23 higher-income and 18 lower-income 
countries that are less complex and 19 higher-income and 24 lower-income countries that are more 
complex. 
 
 
Table 4. Country Group Categories by Income 
Category Higher-income Lower-income 
I Less Corruption & Less Complexity 20 6 
II Less Corruption & More Complexity 9 7 
III More Corruption & Less Complexity 3 12 
IV More Corruption & More Complexity 10 17 
 
 
In Figure 2 we compare the result for higher-income developing countries in the four categories in 
respect of four measures of infrastructural performance. For the last two performance measures 
(population covered by mobile telephony and its price basket), the picture is similar to that in Figure 
1. We see again that generally the category I countries with less corruption and less complexity 
perform better across sectors. The results are less clear for the other categories. However, categories 
II and III, where there is either less corruption or less complexity, generally perform better on 
average than do the category IV countries, where there are higher levels of both corruption and 
complexity. 
 
 
Figure 2. Higher-Income Countries: Summary Statistics for Selected Performance Indicators by 
Categories (I-IV) 
 
 
The pattern among lower-income developing countries is given in Figure 3. First, we note that there 
are few lower-income developing countries in categories I (6) and II (7) where the corruption level 
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is lower. Most countries fall into categories III (12) and IV (17), in which the level of corruption is 
higher. In Figure 3 we notice that the delay when obtaining an electrical connection is actually 
lower in the two categories where there is more corruption. Performance among the more corrupt 
countries is better when there is less complexity, however. With respect to the number of water 
supply failures, categories I and IV perform best, that is when we have equal levels of corruption 
and complexity. The same pattern is seen also for the number of telephone subscribers per 
employee. When we consider delays in obtaining a mainline telephone connection the category III 
and IV countries are again best performers. The share of the population covered by mobile 
telephony is similar for three of the categories while it is noticeable lower for the group of countries 
where the level of corruption is low but complexity is higher. 
 
 
Figure 3. Lower-Income Countries: Summary Statistics for Selected Performance Indicators by 
Categories (I-IV) 
 
 
 
Generally, between the two categories identified as having a lower level of corruption, the group of 
countries where complexity is lower scores higher with respect to utility performance. There is not 
such a pattern between the countries with less or more complexity when the corruption level is 
higher. However, for the lower income countries it does seem as if category IV countries 
outperform category II countries (Figure 3). Thus, given a high level of complexity, countries that 
are more corrupt display better utilities performance. Tajikistan and Azerbaijan are in the IV 
category. These two former Soviet Republics perform well in utilities compared to other countries 
with high levels of complexity. They also display high levels of corruption. The relatively well 
functioning infrastructure is to some extent a legacy of history. This pattern might suggest that 
simplifying procedures alone will not ensure better performance. 
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The next section explores further the corruption-complexity relationship and takes into account the 
importance of institutional quality and income level. 
2.3 The Relationship between Complexity and Corruption 
We assume that the opportunities for corrupt actions may grow with increasing complexity. Our 
hypothesis is that the extent to which this complexity is exploited depends upon the quality of other 
government institutions in the country. The same set of procedures can thus have different 
implications in different countries. 
 
The panel regressions with country fixed effects that are most commonly used in this type of study 
exploit variation over time. However, we have limited data accessibility and concentrate on 
mechanisms that are relatively rigid and consistent for each country over time. A simple cross-
country study is therefore useful. Figure 4 illustrates that for our cross-section of countries less 
procedures are associated with more control of corruption.  
 
 
Figure 4. The number of procedures and control of corruption 
5
10
15
20
-1 0 1 2
Good Governance, Control of Corruption
Number of Procedures to Start a Business Fitted values
 
 
 
The extent to which complexity provides opportunities for corruption or for welfare improvement 
may depend on other characteristics of the economy. We control for the level of development by 
including GDP per capita. A variable measuring the level of confidence in the judicial system is 
included to control for the quality of institutions, and is particularly relevant for corruption. There is 
a correlation of 0.36 between the level of confidence in the judicial system and GDP per capita. 
Although good institutions and development tend to be positively associated, we include both 
variables in the regression. Since we expect a stronger correlation between corruption and 
complexity when the GDP level is lower, we include an interaction term between the number of 
procedures and the level of development, GDP per capita in the regression. Finally, since resource-
rich developing countries are more prone to higher levels of corruption, we include a dummy 
variable which recognizes the effect of being a resource rich country. The summary statistics for the 
sample are reported in Table 5. There are now 90 countries in the sample. These are the same 84 
developing countries that were the basis of our analysis of performance and six developed countries 
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as well. These are included to control for differences across income levels with respect to the 
relationship between complexity and corruption. 
     
 
Table 5. Summary statistics, averages for the 2001-2006 period 
All countries  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Control of Corruption 90 -0.27 0.69 -1.23 1.92
Number of Procedures to Start a Business  88 10.49 2.93 4.00 17.00
Confidence Level in the Judiciary  70 58.96 15.48 17.02 89.68
Real GDP per capita, 2000 US$  90 2876.00 4401.31 105.10 27372.96
Interaction(GDP per Capita*Procedures) 88 26474.05 37246.30 779.18 210901.1
Developing countries     
Control of Corruption 84 -0.38 0.56 -1.23 1.37
Number of Procedures to Start a Business  82 10.56 2.90 5.00 17.00
Confidence Level in the Judiciary  64 57.63 14.99 17.02 87.08
Real GDP per capita, 2000 US$  84 1916.45 1879.26 105.10 8771.89
Interaction(GDP per Capita*Procedures) 82 18171.58 18433.92 779.18 105505.90
 
 
In Table 6 we report the Spearman correlation coefficients for the variables included in our 
regression analysis. We see that the correlation coefficient is 0.6684 between GDP per capita and 
the control of corruption measure. The zero-hypothesis that the two variables are independent is 
rejected at the 1 percent level. Thus there is a positive relationship whereby higher GDP per capita 
is associated with more control of corruption. From the table we also see that the higher the 
confidence level in the judiciary, the higher score on the control of corruption indicator (0.4359). 
Also for these to variables, the hypothesis of independence is rejected at the 1 percent level. This is 
also the case for the relationship between our measure of complexity, the number of procedures, and 
control of corruption. The coefficient is negative at -0.3265, suggesting that a higher number of 
procedures are associated with a lower score on the control of corruption index. Again the lower 
score indicates less control of corruption. We see also that there is a negative correlation between 
the presence of natural resources and control of corruption, suggesting the importance of controlling 
for resources when looking into the complexity-corruption relationship. 
 
 
Table 6. Spearman Rank Order Coefficient, all countries 
Variable  I II III IV 
Control of Corruption I 1.0000    
Number of Procedures to Start a 
Business  II 
-0.3265*** 
(88) 1.0000   
Confidence Level in the Judiciary  III 0.4359
*** 
(70) 
-0.0069 
(69) 1.0000  
Real GDP per capita, 2000 US$  IV 0.6684
*** 
(90) 
-0.2171** 
(88) 
0.2701** 
(70) 1.0000 
Natural Resource (fules/ores) V -0.1767 (86) 
0.2061* 
(84) 
0.0979 
(67) 
-0.1112 
(86) 
The number of observations is in parenthesis. 
The significance level at which the zero hypothesis of independence between variables is rejected: 
* 10% level, ** 5%, *** 10% level 
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Regression Results 
Table 7 reports the results from robust regression of the Control of Corruption measure from the 
Governance Indicators. We reported results for the pooled sample of developing and developed 
countries, including a dummy identifying the developing countries and the result for the developing 
countries only. For the pooled sample we see that a lower number of procedures is associated with 
stronger control of corruption. That is, more procedures are associated with higher levels of 
corruption. However, the interaction term between the number of procedures and GDP per capita is 
positive, which supports our hypothesis since this implies that the relationship between complexity 
and corruption depends on the country's GDP level. The presence of natural resources has a 
negative effect of the control of corruption measure. However, we also see that even though the 
regression returns a relatively high R² at 0.7989, the RESET test rejects the hypothesis that there are 
no omitted variables. There are only six developed countries in the sample. When we run the 
regression on developing countries only, the coefficient for number of procedures is nearly halved 
and the importance of GDP per capita in determining the level of control of corruption increases. 
Also the interaction variable for GDP per capita and number of procedures is no longer significant. 
 
 
Table 7. Results from Robust Regression on 2001-2006 averages 
 Developed and Developing Countries Pooled 
Developing 
Countries 
Number of Procedures to Start a 
Business  
-0.061*** 
(0.014) 
-0.060*** 
(0.014) 
-0.028** 
(0.011) 
-0.036** 
(0.018) 
Confidence Level in the Judiciary  0.008
*** 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Real GDP per capita, 2000 US$  0.00004
* 
(0.00002) 
0.00005** 
(0.00002) 
0.0002*** 
(0.00002) 
0.0002* 
(0.00009) 
Natural Resource (fuel/ores) -0264
** 
(0.101) 
-0.277*** 
(0.095) 
-0.289*** 
(0.091) 
-0.291*** 
(0.091) 
 Interaction(GDP per 
Capita*Procedures) 
0.000008** 
(0.000003) 
0.000009*** 
(0.000003) 
 
 
0.000005 
(0.000009) 
Developing Countries Dummy  0.407 (0.448)   
Constant -0.457
** 
(0.207) 
-0.889 
(0.550) 
-0.982*** 
(0.172) 
-0.900*** 
(0.185) 
R2 0.7989 0.8048 0.7398 0.7412 
F-test all coefficients=0 p-value 0.0000 
p-value 
0.0000 
p-value 
0.0000 
p-value 
0.0000 
Reset Test p-value 0.0001 
p-value 
0.0002 
p-value 
0.6149 
p-value 
0.4468 
B-P/C-W test for heteroskedasticity p-value 0.0420 
p-value 
0.0165 
p-value 
0.3258 
p-value 
0.3739 
Number of observations 66 66 60 60 
*       Indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
**     Indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
***  Indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
 
 
Even if the R² at 0.7412 is lower for the developing countries sample, the RESET test now cannot 
reject the hypothesis that there are no omitted variables and thus provides a more accurate 
representation of the empirical relationship for this sample. 
CMI WORKING PAPER BUREAUCRATIC COMPLEXITY AND IMPACTS OF CORRUPTION IN UTILITIES WP 2008: 2 
 13 
3 Conclusion 
For most of the performance measures there are few observations, and it is difficult to apply 
regression analysis. We have therefore divided our sample into several categories of countries based 
on the level of corruption, complexity and income in order to assess the effect of complexity and 
corruption on the sector performance of utilities. We find that for the full sample of 84 developing 
countries, the level of corruption and complexity coincides as 53 countries fall into categories I and 
IV, where we have less corruption and less complexity and more corruption and more complexity 
respectively. 
 
With respect to performance, the general rule seems to be that performance is better when 
corruption and complexity levels are lower. When we split the countries into two sub-groups based 
on income levels, this still holds true for the higher income half of the sample. As many as 30 of the 
42 countries fall into categories I and IV, in which the levels of corruption and complexity 
corresponds. Most of the countries in the higher-income half are characterized as being less corrupt 
(29 of 42). The situation is different when we consider the lower-income half of the sample, 
however. Then we see that 29 countries are perceived as being more corrupt, and there is no longer 
a correspondence between corruption and complexity levels. For this group performance is also not 
generally better when corruption and complexity levels are lower. 
 
This lends support to a hypothesis that having a large number of administrative rules may function 
differently in rich and poor countries. In countries with strong institutions the procedures may 
function as intended and guarantee a thorough administrative process, hence serving as a barrier 
against ad hoc solutions and favoritism. In poorer countries with weaker institutions a large number 
of procedures, established with the same intention, may have the reverse effect and increase the risk 
of corruption. Further this could suggest that when designing instruments of regulation to tackle 
corruption, for example in terms of simplifying procedures, these might work differently according 
to income level. 
 
Income levels are highly correlated both to the corruption level, as we have see here, but also to the 
general level of institutional quality. If fewer and simpler procedures are meant to be a counter-
measure against corruption demands are made on institutional quality as well. If fewer procedures 
result in more transparency, there is still a need for information to be disseminated and for some 
form of control of violations. A well-functioning judiciary and a free press that is willing and able 
to report abuses of power would be supplements to simplifying procedures. Thus, countries need to 
reach a certain level of institutional quality to benefit from less complexity. 
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SUMMARY
This paper explores how the relationship between bureaucratic complexity and 
corruption affects the performance in utilities. We observe considerable variation 
in the performance of the utilities across countries, also across countries which 
appear to be relatively similar in terms of GDP per capita. Our hypothesis is that 
corruption is an important explanatory factor. In particular, corruption coupled 
with a complex regulatory structure can have negative effects on performance in 
this sector. The analysis points at the importance of considering the institutional 
framework and quality when introducing new bureaucratic procedures, as the 
same set of policy advice can work differently across countries. We measure 
bureaucratic complexity by the number of procedures needed for starting a 
business from the Doing Business Database provided by the World Bank.
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